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Abstract: According to the philosopher and scientist Charles Peirce (1839–1914)
phenomenology is fundamental to all scientific inquiry and association is the only
force that exists within the intellect. However, Peirce only gave his reader a hint about
the relationship between phenomenology and association. In this articlewewill try to
follow that hint and point towards a couple of main questions that can guide a
Peircean phenomenological description of association. Hence, the conclusion of the
articlewill not beaphenomenologicaldescriptionof associationbut rather a coupleof
main questions trying to determine how such a phenomenological description can
begin in the first place. Our hypothesis is that the questions depend for their construc-
tion on the inter-relatedness and interdependence of certain central Peircean phe-
nomenological concepts – especially, Thirdness, Secondness, and Firstness.
Keywords: association, phenomenology, C. S. Peirce
[N]othing is truer than true poetry. And let me tell the scientific men that the artists are
much finer and more accurate observers than they are, except of the special minutiae that
the scientific man is looking for.
– Charles S. Peirce, Lectures on Pragmatism, 1903 (CP 1.315).
1 Introduction
According to the philosopher and natural scientist Charles Peirce (1839–1914) the
act of association is: “the only force which exists within the intellect” (W 5: 326).
Ideas are associated with each other through law or a tendency toward habit
formation, hence: “There is a law in th[e] succession of ideas. We may roughly
say that it is the law of habit. It is the great “Law of the Association of ideas”
(CP 7.389). Peirce maintained that phenomenology is fundamental for all scientific
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inquiry and he gave a hint about how to conceive association from a phenomen-
ological perspective when he placed association in relation to the concept of
medisense: “it has several varieties…the third [variety] is that of…association” (CP
7.544–50). The aim of this article is to follow that hint and to point towards a couple
of main questions that can guide a Peircean phenomenological description of
association. Hence, the conclusion of the article will not be a phenomenological
description of association but rather a couple of main questions trying to determine
how such a phenomenological description can begin in the first place. Our hypoth-
esis is that the questions depend for their construction on the inter-relatedness and
interdependence of certain central Peircean phenomenological concepts – espe-
cially, Thirdness, Secondness, and Firstness.
2 Phenomenology – medisense, altersense,
and feeling
In order to get started, let us focus on some preliminary points of Peirce’s science of
phenomenology. According to Peirce, phenomenology is the first of the philoso-
phical sciences. This means that in the architecture of his philosophical theory,
phenomenology is the most fundamental science and its categories – of utter
generality and centrality – are the most basic building blocks of the other philoso-
phical sciences: aesthetics, ethics, logical, and metaphysics. Phenomenology con-
templates phenomena as they are in order to discern the universal and necessary
structures of consciousness. Having observed a very wide range of phenomena
present to consciousness, Peirce came to the conclusion that there is a process of
bringing to mind as a category of the phenomenon. Or, as Peirce wrote himself:
“The removal of sensation from the department of cognition, or Knowledge, leaves
nothing remaining in that department except what are called Mediate Cognitions,
that is, Knowledges through some third idea or process different from either the
Knowing self or the Known object” (CP 7.544). And then we have arrived where we
started – at the concept of medisense – because as Peirce furthermore wrote: “All
consciousness of a process belongs to this medisense” (CP 7.544). Hence, we can
already ask the first – and most overall – question concerning a Peircean phenom-
enological description of association: 1) As a variety of medisense, how does
association “bring something to mind”? Peirce himself did describe association as
a variety of medisense in the following manner:
A great many associations of ideas are inherited. Others grow up spontaneously. The rest
depend upon the principle that ideas once brought together into a set remain in that set.
Many associations are merely accidental. A child acquires a distaste for a particular kind of
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food merely because it ate it when it was sick. The idea of that food and the feeling of
sickness are brought into a set; and the consequence is that every time the idea of that food
reaches a high degree of vividness, the feeling of sickness gets a swift upward motion.
Other associations cannot be called accidental because it was in the nature of things that
they should appear in sets. Thus, light and warm get associated in our minds because they
are associated in Nature. (CP 7.550)
However, from the phenomenological perspective there must be more to it
than if there indeed is “a great law of association” – and in the same paragraph
Peirce did also say almost as an apology: “at present I hurry to the third form of
medisense that of…association” (CP 7.550) – in an indirect way warning his
reader that he would quickly leave the topic again. But how can we proceed
from the paragraph in a systematic manner? Well, one way seems to be with
Peirce understanding medisense as a part of a larger phenomenological system
of concepts. First, Peirce said that consciousness forms a system and that
medisense is related to two other categories, namely, feeling and altersense.
According to Peirce, feeling and altersense can be defined in the following way:
“Feeling is the momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in its
pristine simplicity, apart from anything else. It is consciousness in its first
state. Altersense is the consciousness of a directly present other or second,
withstanding us” (CP 7.551).
But how is medisense related to altersense and feeling? Before we come to that,
let us just mention how Peirce stressed that there are no other forms of conscious-
ness than medisense, altersense, and feeling. This means that a Peircean phenom-
enological description of association, in principle, must not merely be regulatively
valid, butmust be definitive. Peirce advanced numerous arguments in favor of three
and only three categories such as: “The fact that the minds of man have ever been
inclined to threefold divisions is one of the considerations in favor of them” (CP
1.368). Coming back to how medisense is related to feeling and altersense, we just
have to look at the word itself focusing on “medi,” because according to Peirce this
is exactly what this category of consciousness does – it mediates between feeling
and altersense: “leading from the former to the latter” (CP 7.551). In the same
paragraph, Peirce clarifies furthermore: “Feeling…is the consciousness of firstness;
altersense is consciousness of otherness or secondness; medisense is the conscious-
ness of means or Thirdness” (CP 7.551).
This description is of utmost centrality concerning our phenomenological
questions regarding association, because here Peirce is making an explicit
reference to the three concepts of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness in
order to explain the three modes of consciousness. What is important for our
purpose is that the three concepts according to Peirce are related in a certain
hierarchical order. Peirce did argue for this hierarchy from different perspectives
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and by using different kinds of methods (also mathematical and relational
logical) – here it will suffice to give an example from Peirce’s research in logic
from the article “On a New List of Categories” (1868):
I can discriminate red from blue, space from color, and color from space, but not red from
color. I can prescind red from blue, and space from color (as is manifest from the fact that I
actually believe there is an uncolored space between my face and the wall); but I cannot
prescind color from space, nor red from color. I can dissociate red from blue, but not space
from color, color from space, nor red from color. (CP 1.549)
In terms of the categories, it means that we can abstract Firstness from
Secondness, but not vice versa. In the same manner, we can abstract Secondness
from Thirdness, but not vice versa. Furthermore, the converse of this principle
implies that Thirdness must involve Secondness as well as Firstness, and
Secondness must involve Firstness. Finally, the principle also means that the
categories “Firstness-Secondness-Thirdness” are organized in terms of increasing
complexity. Hence, returning to our focus on association we can now deduce our
second question concerning the phenomenological description of association: 2) In
what way does association as a variety of medisense – or Thirdness – involve and
mediate between altersense – or Secondness –as well as feeling – or Firstness? Put
in another way: association involves altersense and feeling as necessary steps in the
process of association. However, together they cannot fulfill the process without the
conception of the Third in order to make association intelligible (Figure 1).
But with Peirce we find that things become even more complicated for at
least two reasons: first, we remember that Peirce mentioned association as
the third variety of medisense; hence, in addition to association he also
described two other varieties termed abstraction and suggestion. Second,
Peirce understood ideas as being attracted to one another by associational
habits and dispositions associated by similarity, contiguity, and interest,
respectively.
3 Association, abstraction, and suggestion
Concerning the first previously mentioned term: Peirce described the two other
varieties of medisense – abstraction and suggestion – in the following manner:
In the first place there is a separative process, the centrifugal tendency of thought, by
which any idea by following out its own development becomes separated from those with
which it is connected. We see this in attention…I have spoken of the first kind of
medisense, abstraction, which breaks one idea away from another. There is an opposite
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influence by which when one idea has its vividness increased it gives an upward impulse
to a number of other ideas with which it is connected so that it forms one set with them…
I prefer the…English word suggestion. (CP 7.544–48)
So we must, somehow, also address the fact that association – as a variety
of medisense – is related to two other varieties of medisense, in order to point
towards questions that should be answered in a phenomenological description
of association. But how shall we address this? Peirce said that association is the
third variety of medisense and he also defined it after having first defined
abstraction and suggestion. Therefore, we will follow Peirce’s chronology
when he defined the three varieties of medisense – first defining abstraction,
then suggestion, and finally association – and understand abstraction, sugges-
tion, and association as a continuum of increasing complexity. Or put another
way: association is a Third also involving the two other varieties of medisense:
suggestion and abstraction. Hence, we can now deduce our third question
concerning the phenomenological description of association: 3) Being a Third
of medisense, how does association involve and mediate between suggestion as
well as abstraction respectively? (Figure 2).
Figure 1: The phenomenological premises for our first and second question: the basic phe-
nomenological hierarchy of inclusion and complexity.
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As the previously mentioned quote indicates, when working with the question
one should take a special interest in the concept of attention and the perception
of individual objects (abstraction related to altersense) as well as the way
feelings become connected (suggestion) in an overall process “…where some-
thing not-self is set up over against the consciousness.” (CP 7.544).
3.1 Association, similarity, contiguity, and interest
As mentioned in the above, Peirce understood ideas as being attracted to one
another by associational habits and dispositions by similarity, contiguity, and
interest. Hence, now we have moved to the specific types of association as
described by Peirce (and to a horizontal dimension of association). Peirce was
very well acquainted with the history of theories of the association of ideas, and
he frequently referred to thinkers such as Aristotle, Abelard, St. Thomas
Aquinas, Locke, Hume, James Mill, and Bain, to mention but a few. Peirce
himself focused on the relation between ideas believing that association is the
only force that exists within the intellect. Hence, there is a regularity concerning
the connection of ideas, and according to Peirce ideas are connected via
Figure 2: The phenomenological premises for our third question: the basic phenomenological
hierarchy of inclusion and complexity concerning the three varieties of medisense.
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similarity, contiguity, and interest. Association via similarity results from a
power within. Peirce wrote the following about association via similarity:
It is absurd to say that different things which cannot be compared are alike, except in the
sense that they act alike. Now, two ideas are compared only in the idea of the class, lot, or
set to which they belong; and they act alike only in so far as they have one and the same
relation to that connecting idea. Resemblance, then, is a mode of association by the inward
nature of ideas and of mind. (CP 7.392)
The similarity is based on behavior and recognition of shared properties;
however, the mature Peirce was an extreme realist, arguing for the reality of the
three categories (see, e.g., CP 1.422, 8.208). As a consequence it is not mind that
introduces the similarity. Concerning association via contiguity, Peirce wrote
that it is experience that relates two ideas or it is a: “…connection due to a power
without” (CP 6.105). Or put in other words: in association via contiguity there is
an: “… external compulsion upon us to think things together” (W 6: 186).
Therefore, in association via contiguity we are compelled to pay attention for
some reason. For example, two things in proximity to each other or in a
temporal sequence can become related. Finally, according to Peirce association
via interest should be understood in the following way:
Another kind of association which is very important is that which makes an idea interest-
ing. I propose to term it association by interest. An idea occurs to us in such a way that it
would, other things being equal, be very dim. For example, it may result from a fortuitous
putting together of two other ideas both of which are sunk deep in the subconscious mind.
But if the new idea happens to be interesting, it will promptly become vivid. (CP 7.499)
An idea becomes interesting when it corresponds to the composite of ideas
concerning aims, ideals, and purposes of someone; association via interest takes
place when an idea is drawn into vividness by the vividness of the composite of
ideas concerning aims, ideals, and purposes. After having shortly described the
three types of association according to Peirce, it is time to return to the phenomen-
ological perspective. Keeping in line with the previous argumentation, we believe
that next question concerning a Peircean phenomenological description of associa-
tion should involve a focus on the relationship between the concepts of similarity,
contiguity, and interest. And keeping in line with the same argumentation, we will
also take a look at the phenomenological status of the three concepts – meaning
how they are determined by Thirdness, Secondness, and Firstness. A possible
way to do that is by looking at the relationship between the types of association
and Peirce’s most important typology of signs – the “second sign-trichotomy”
consisting of icon, index, and symbol (see CP 2.275). With respect to this relation-
ship Peirce accentuated the following: “The association of ideas is said to proceed
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according to three principles…But it would be equally true to say that signs denote
what they do” (W 2: 237). The point is that the icon, index, and symbol correspond
to the three types of association. Hence, whenwe represent the dynamical object via
the representamen and the interpretant (see, e.g., SS: 80–81) we can do that based
on similarity, contiguity, and interest. In “Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic”
(c.1903) Peirce also wrote:
A regular progression of one, two, three may be remarked in the three orders of signs, Icon,
Index, Symbol. The Icon has no dynamical connection with the object it represents; it
simply happens that its qualities resemble those of that object, and excite analogous
sensations in the mind for which it is a likeness. But it really stands unconnected with
them. The index is physically connected with its object; they make an organic pair, but the
interpreting mind has nothing to do with this connection, except remarking it, after it is
established. The symbol is connected with its object by virtue of the idea of the symbol-
using mind, without which no such connection would exist. (CP 2.299)
But then we can also deduce that similarity is determined by Firstness, con-
tiguity is determined by Secondness, and interest is determined by Thirdness –
because the icon, the index, and the symbol are signs of Firstness, Secondness, and
Thirdness, respectively. This puts us into a position where we can think of the three
types of association in a phenomenological perspective – association by interest is a
Third in the triad of types of association, and it must, therefore, directly involve
contiguity and similarity indirectly – thereby association by interest must also be
the highest type or the most complex type of association (see, e.g., CP 2.237). This
brings us to formulate our fourth and final question concerning the phenomenolo-
gical description of association: 4) How does association by interest involve and
mediate between contiguity and similarity? (Figure 3).
4 Concluding thoughts
According to Peirce association is the only force that exists within the intellect.
But how can we explore into the nature of this interesting mechanism of the
intellect? Given the fact that the phenomenological categories are universal and
necessary features of all experience, it makes sense to treat association as a
“phenomenon” in a Peircean perspective. In the above we have tried to point
towards four questions that can be the basis of a phenomenological description;
and the questions themselves rest on the following premises concerning at least
three triadic phenomenological relations of interdependence:
– As a variety of medisense, association must involve altersense and feeling.
– As the third variety of medisense, association must involve and mediate
between abstraction and suggestion.
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– There are three different types of association, these types of association must – in
different ways – be related to 1) and 2).
– The three different types of association are interrelated in a hierarchy, where
interest is a Third, hence involving and mediating between contiguity and
similarity.
Now the Peircean phenomenological work can begin to answer the following
four questions:
1) As a variety of medisense, how does association “bring something to mind”?
Which seems to rest upon 2) and 3):
2) Inwhat way does association as a variety ofmedisense – or Thirdness – involve
and mediate between altersense – or Secondness – as well as feeling – or
Firstness?
3) Being a Third of medisense, how does association involve and mediate
between suggestion as well as abstraction respectively?
4) How does association by interest involve and mediate between contiguity
and similarity?
Figure 3: The phenomenological premises for our fourth question: the basic phenomenological
hierarchy of inclusion and complexity concerning the three types of association.
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